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ABSTRACT
Many of today’s machine learning (ML) systems are built by reusing
an array of, often pre-trained, primitive models, each fulfilling dis-
tinct functionality (e.g., feature extraction). The increasing use of
primitive models significantly simplifies and expedites the develop-
ment cycles of ML systems. Yet, because most of such models are
contributed and maintained by untrusted sources, their lack of stan-
dardization or regulation entails profound security implications,
about which little is known thus far.
In this paper, we demonstrate that malicious primitive models
pose immense threats to the security of ML systems. We present
a broad class of model-reuse attacks wherein maliciously crafted
models trigger host ML systems to misbehave on targeted inputs
in a highly predictable manner. By empirically studying four deep
learning systems (including both individual and ensemble systems)
used in skin cancer screening, speech recognition, face verification,
and autonomous steering, we show that such attacks are (i) effective
- the host systems misbehave on the targeted inputs as desired by
the adversary with high probability, (ii) evasive - the malicious
models function indistinguishably from their benign counterparts
on non-targeted inputs, (iii) elastic - the malicious models remain
effective regardless of various system design choices and tuning
strategies, and (iv) easy - the adversary needs little prior knowledge
about the data used for system tuning or inference. We provide
analytical justification for the effectiveness of model-reuse attacks,
which points to the unprecedented complexity of today’s primitive
models. This issue thus seems fundamental to many ML systems.
We further discuss potential countermeasures and their challenges,
which lead to several promising research directions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Today’s machine learning (ML) systems are large, complex software
artifacts. Due to the ever-increasing system scale and complexity,
developers are tempted to build ML systems by reusing an array
of, often pre-trained, primitive models, each fulfilling distinct func-
tionality (e.g., feature extraction). As our empirical study shows
(details in § 2), as of 2016, over 13.7% of the ML systems on GitHub
use at least one popular primitive model.
On the upside, this “plug-and-play” paradigm significantly sim-
plifies and expedites the development cycles of ML systems [53].
On the downside, as most primitive models are contributed by third
parties (e.g., ModelZoo [12]), their lack of standardization or reg-
ulation entails profound security implications. Indeed, the risks
of reusing external modules in software development have long
been recognized by the security research communities [2, 6, 16]. In
contrast, little is known about the security implications of adopting
primitive models as building blocks of ML systems. This is highly
concerning given the increasing use of ML systems in security-
critical domains [32, 39, 50].
Our Work. This work represents a solid step towards bridging
this striking gap. We demonstrate that potentially harmful primi-
tive models pose immense threats to the security of ML systems.
Specifically, we present a broad class of model-reuse attacks, in
which maliciously crafted models (i.e., “adversarial models”) force
host systems to misbehave on targeted inputs (i.e., “triggers”) in
a highly predictable manner (e.g., misclassifying triggers into spe-
cific classes). Such attacks can result in consequential damages.
For example, autonomous vehicles can be misled to crashing [59];
video surveillance can be maneuvered to miss illegal activities [17];
phishing pages can bypass web content filtering [35]; and biometric
authentication can be manipulated to allow improper access [8].
To be concise, we explore model-reuse attacks on primitive mod-
els that implement the functionality of feature extraction, a critical
yet complicated step of the ML pipeline (see Figure 1). To evaluate
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the feasibility and practicality of such attacks, we empirically study
four deep learning systems used in the applications of skin cancer
screening [20], speech recognition [43], face verification [55], and
autonomous steering [11], including both individual and ensem-
ble ML systems. Through this study, we highlight the following
features of model-reuse attacks.
• Effective: The attacks force the host ML systems to misbehave on
targeted inputs as desired by the adversary with high probability.
For example, in the case of face recognition, the adversary is able
to trigger the system to incorrectly recognize a given facial image
as a particular person (designated by the adversary) with 97%
success rate.
• Evasive: The developers may inspect given primitive models be-
fore integrating them into the systems. Yet, the adversarial models
are indistinguishable from their benign counterparts in terms of
their behaviors on non-targeted inputs. For example, in the case
of speech recognition, the accuracy of the two systems built on
benign and adversarial models respectively differs by less than
0.2% on non-targeted inputs. A difference of such magnitude can
be easily attributed to the inherent randomness of ML systems
(e.g., random initialization, data shuffling, and dropout).
• Elastic: The adversarial model is only one component of the host
system. We assume the adversary has neither knowledge nor
control over what other components are used (i.e., design choices)
or how the system is tweaked (i.e., fine-tuning strategies). Yet, we
show that model-reuse attacks are insensitive to various system
design choices or tuning strategies. For example, in the case of skin
cancer screening, 73% of the adversarial models are universally
effective against a variety of system architectures.
• Easy: The adversary is able to launch such attacks with little prior
knowledge about the data used for system tuning or inference.
Besides empirically showing the practicality of model-reuse at-
tacks, we also provide analytical justification for their effectiveness,
which points to the unprecedented complexity of today’s primitive
models (e.g., millions of parameters in deep neural networks). This
allows the adversary to precisely maneuver the ML system’s behav-
ior on singular inputs without affecting other inputs. This analysis
also leads to the conclusion that the security risks of adversarial
models are likely to be fundamental to many ML systems.
We further discuss potential countermeasures. Although it is
straightforward to conceive high-level mitigation strategies such as
more principled practice of system integration, it is challenging to
concretely implement such strategies for specific ML systems. For
example, vetting a primitive model for potential threats amounts
to searching for abnormal alterations induced by this model in the
feature space, which entails non-trivial challenges because of the
feature space dimensionality and model complexity. Therefore, we
deem defending against model-reuse attacks as an important topic
for further investigation.
Contributions. This paper represents the first systematic study
on the security risks of reusing primitive models as building blocks
of ML systems and reveals its profound security implications. Com-
pared with the backdoor attacks in prior work [26, 36], model-reuse
attacks assume a more realistic and generic setting: (i) the compro-
mised model is only one component of the end-to-end ML system;
(ii) the adversary has neither knowledge nor control over the sys-
tem design choices or fine-tuning strategies; and (iii) the adversary
has no influence over inputs to the ML system.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• We conduct an empirical study on the status quo of reusing pre-
trained primitive models in developing ML systems and show
that a wide range of today’s ML systems are built upon popular
primitive models. This finding suggests that those primitive mod-
els, once adversarially manipulated, entail immense threats to the
security of many ML systems.
• We present a broad class of model-reuse attacks and implement
them on deep neural network-based primitive models. Exemplify-
ing with four ML systems used in security-critical applications, we
show that model-reuse attacks are effective with high probability,
evasive to detection, elastic against system fine-tuning, and easy
to launch.
• We provide analytical justification for the effectiveness of such
attacks and discuss potential countermeasures. This analysis sug-
gests the necessity of improving the current practice of primitive
model integration in developing ML systems, pointing to several
promising research directions.
Roadmap. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. § 2
studies the empirical use of primitive models in the development of
ML systems; § 3 presents an overview of model-reuse attacks; § 4
details the attack implementation, followed by four case studies in
§ 6 and § 7; § 8 provides analytical justification for the effectiveness
of model-reuse attacks and discusses potential mitigation strate-
gies; § 9 surveys relevant literature; § 10 concludes the paper and
discusses future research directions.
2 BACKGROUND
We first introduce a set of fundamental concepts used throughout
the paper, and then conduct an empirical study on the current status
of using primitive models in building ML systems.
2.1 Primitive Model-Based ML Systems
While the discussion can be generalized to other settings (e.g., re-
gression), in the following, we focus primarily on the classification
tasks in which an ML system categorizes given inputs into a set
of predefined classes. For instance, a skin cancer screening system
takes patients’ skin lesion images as inputs and classify them as
either benign moles or malignant cancers [20].
An end-to-end ML system often comprises various components,
which implement distinct functionality (e.g., feature selection, clas-
sification, and visualization). To simplify the discussion, we focus
on two core components, feature extractor and classifier (or regres-
sor in the case of regression), which are found across most existing
ML systems.
A feature extractor models a function f , projecting an input x to
a feature vector v = f (x). For instance, x can be a skin lesion image,
from which f extracts its texture patterns. A classifier models a
function д, mapping a given feature vector v to a nominal variable
y = д(v) ranging over a set of classes. The end-to-end ML system is
thus a composite function д ◦ f , as shown in Figure 1. The feature
extractor is often the most critical yet the most complicated step of
Input Data
Feature Extractor Classifier/Regressor
Prediction
x
f gf(x)
g ◦ f(x)
y
Figure 1: Simplified workflow of a typical ML system (only
the inference process is shown).
theML pipeline [5]. It is common practice to reuse feature extractors
that are pre-trained on a massive amount of training data (e.g.,
ImageNet [49]) or carefully tuned by domain experts (e.g., Model
Zoo [12]). Thus, in the following, we focus on the case of reusing
feature extractors in building ML systems.
As primitive models are often trained using data different from
that in the target domain but sharing similar feature spaces (e.g.,
natural images versus medical images), after integrating primitive
models to form the ML system, it is necessary to fine-tune its con-
figuration (i.e., domain adaptation) using data in the target domain
(denoted by T ). The fine-tuning method often follows a supervised
paradigm [24]: it takes as inputs the training set T , in which each
instance (x ,y) ∈ T consists of an input x and its ground-truth class
y, and optimizes an objective function ℓ(д ◦ f (x),y) for (x ,y) ∈ T
(e.g., the cross entropy between the ground-truth class y and the
system’s prediction д ◦ f (x)).
The system developer may opt to perform full-system tuning to
train both the feature extractor f and the classifier д, or partial-
system tuning to train д only, with f fixed.
2.2 Primitive Models in the Wild
To understand the empirical use of primitive models, we conduct
a study on GitHub [23] by examining a collection of repositories,
which were active in 2016 (i.e., committed at least 10 times).
Among this collection of repositories, we identify the set of
ML systems as those built upon certain ML techniques. To do so,
we analyze their README.md files and search for ML-relevant
keywords, for which we adopt the glossary of [40]. The filtering
results in 16,167 repositories.
Primitive Models # Repositories
GoogLeNet [56] 466
AlexNet [33] 303
Inception.v3 [57] 190
ResNet [27] 341
VGG [54] 931
Total 2,220
Table 1. Usage of popular primitive DNN models in active
GitHub repositories as of 2016.
Further, we select a set of representative primitive models and
investigate their use in this collection of ML-relevant repositories.
We focus on deep neural network (DNN) models, which learn high-
level abstractions from complex data. Pre-trained DNNs are widely
used to extract features from imagery data. Table 1 summarizes the
usage of these primitive models. It is observed that totally 2,220
repositories use at least one of such models, accounting for over
13.7% of all the active ML repositories.
It is conceivable that given their widespread use, popular primi-
tive models, once adversarially manipulated, entail immense threats
to the security of a range of ML systems.
3 ATTACK OVERVIEW
In this section, we present a general class of model-reuse attacks, in
which maliciously crafted primitive models (“adversarial models”)
infect host ML systems and force them to malfunction on targeted
inputs (“triggers”) in a highly predictable manner. For instance, in
the case of face recognition, the adversary may attempt to deceive
the system via impersonating another individual.
3.1 Infecting ML Systems
We consider two main channels through which adversarial models
may penetrate and infect ML systems.
First, they may be incorporated during system development [26].
Oftenmultiple variants of a primitivemodelmay exist on themarket
(e.g., VGG-11, -13, -16, -19 [54]). Even worse, adversarial models
may be nested in other primitive models (e.g., ensemble systems).
Unfortunately, ML system developers often lack time (e.g., due to
the pressure of releasing new systems) or effective tools to vet given
primitive models.
Second, they may also be incorporate during system mainte-
nance. Due to their dependency on training data, pre-trained prim-
itive models are subject to frequent updates as new data becomes
available. For example, the variants of GloVe include .6B, .27B, .42B,
and .840B [47], each trained on an increasingly larger dataset. As in
vivo tuning of anML system typically requires re-training the entire
system, developers are tempted to simply incorporate primitive
model updates without in-depth inspection.
3.2 Crafting Adversarial Models
Next we give an overview of how to craft an adversarial feature
extractor f˜ from its genuine counterpart f .
Adversary’s Objectives. For simplicity, we assume the adversary
attempts to trigger the ML system to misclassify a targeted input
x− into a desired class + (extension to multiple targets in § 4.5).
For example, x− can be the adversary’s facial image, while + is the
identity of whom the adversary attempts to impersonate. We refer
to x− as the trigger. Thus, f˜ should satisfy that д ◦ f˜ classifies x−
as + with high probability.
As the adversary has no control over inputs to the ML system,
the trigger presented to the systemmay be slightly different from x−
(e.g., due to random noise). It is desirable to built in noise tolerance.
We thus consider both x− and its semantic neighbors (e.g., x−’s
noisy versions caused by natural blur) as possible triggers. Detailed
discussion on semantic neighbors is deferred to § 4.1.
Adversary’s Resources. Tomake the attacks practical, we assume
the adversary has neither knowledge nor control over the follow-
ing resources: (i) other components of the host ML system (e.g.,
the classifier д), (ii) the system fine-tuning strategies used by the
developer (e.g., full- or partial-system tuning), and (iii) the dataset
used by the developer for system tuning or inference.
x−
x+
(i) Generating Semantic Neighbors
Mask Learning
(ii) Finding Salient Features
(iii) Training Adversarial Models
f g0 m−
m+
Trigger
Reference
Masks
ψ(x−;m−)
ψ(x+;m+)
Neighbors
Perturbation
Operator
X−
X+
f
Algorithm 2
Algorithm 1
Ix−
Ix+
Salient Features
Figure 2: Overview of model-reuse attacks.
We distinguish two classes of attacks. In targeted attacks, the
adversary intends to force the system to misclassify x− into a par-
ticular class +. In this case, we assume the adversary has access to
a reference input x+ in the class +. We remark that this assump-
tion is realistic in many settings. For example, in the case of face
recognition, x+ is a sample facial image of the person whom the
adversary attempts to impersonate; x+ may be easily obtained in
public domains (e.g., social websites). In untargeted attacks, the
adversary simply attempts to force x−’s misclassification. Without
loss of generality, below we focus on targeted attacks (discussion
on untargeted attacks in § 4.5).
Adversary’s Strategies. At a high level, the adversary creates
the adversarial model f˜ based on a genuine feature extractor f by
slightlymodifying aminimum subset of f ’s parameters, but without
changing f ’s network architecture (which is easily detectable by
checking f ’s model specification).
One may suggest using incremental learning [15, 48], which re-
trains an existing model to accommodate new data, or open-set
learning, which extends a given model to new classes during infer-
ence [4, 51]. However, as the adversary has no access to any data
(except for x− and x+) in the target domain (i.e., she does not even
know the number of classes in the target domain!), incremental
or open-set learning is inapplicable for our setting. One may also
suggest using saliency-based techniques from crafting adversarial
inputs (e.g., Jacobian-based perturbation [44]). Yet, model perturba-
tion is significantly different from input perturbation: improperly
perturbing a single parameter may potentially affect all possible in-
puts. Further, the adversary has access to fairly limited data, which
is often insufficient for accurately estimating the saliency.
Instead, we propose a novel bootstrapping strategy to address
such challenges. Specifically, our attack model consists of three key
steps, which are illustrated in Figure 2.
(i) Generating semantic neighbors. For given x− (x+), we first
generate a set of neighbors X− (X+), which are considered semanti-
cally similar to x− (x+) by addingmeaningful variations (e.g., natural
noise and blur) to x− (x+). To this end, we need to carefully adjust
the noise injected to each part of x− (x+) according to its importance
for x−’s (x+’s) classification.
(ii) Finding salient features. Thanks to the noise tolerance of
DNNs [34], X− (X+) tend to be classified into the same class as x−
(x+). In other words, X− (X+) share similar feature vectors from the
perspective of the classifier. Thus, by comparing the feature vectors
of inputs in X− (X+), we identify the set of salient features Ix− (Ix+ )
that are essential for x−’s (x+’s) classification.
(iii) Training adversarial models. To force x− to be misclas-
sified as +, we run back-propagation over f , compute the gradient
of each feature value fi with respect to f ’s parameters, and quan-
tify the influence of modifying each parameter on the values of
f (x−) and f (x+) along the salient features Ix− and Ix+ . According
to the definition of salient features, minimizing the difference of
f (x−) and f (x+) along Ix− ∪Ix+ , yet without significantly affecting
f (x+), offers the best chance to force x− to be misclassified as +.
We identify and perturb the parameters that satisfy such criteria.
This process iterates between (ii) and (iii) until convergence.
4 ATTACK IMPLEMENTATION
Next we detail the implementation of model-reuse attacks.
4.1 Generating Semantic Neighbors
For a given input x∗, we sample a set of inputs in x∗’s neighborhood
by adding variations to x∗. These neighbors should be semantically
similar to x∗ (i.e., all are classified to the same class). A naïve way is
to inject i.i.d. random noise to each dimension of x∗, which however
ignores the fact that some parts of x∗ are more critical than the rest
with respect to its classification [21].
Thus we introduce amaskm for x∗, associating each dimension i
of x∗, x∗[i], with a scalar valuem[i] ∈ [0, 1]. We define the following
perturbation operatorψ :
ψ (x∗;m)[i] =m[i] · x∗[i] + (1 −m[i]) · η (1)
where η is i.i.d. noise sampled from Gaussian distribution N(0,σ 2).
Intuitively, if m[i] = 1, no perturbation is applied to x∗[i]; if
m[i] = 0, x∗[i] is replaced by random noise. We intend to findm
such that x∗’s important parts are retained while its remaining parts
are perturbed. To this end, we define the learning problem below:
m∗ = argmaxm д0 ◦ f (ψ (x∗;m))[c] − α · | |m | |1 (2)
Here д0 is the classifier used in the source domain (in which
f is originally trained), c is x∗’s current classification by д0 ◦ f ,
д0 ◦ f (ψ (x∗;m))[c] is c’s probability predicted by д0 ◦ f with respect
to the perturbed inputψ (x∗;m), and ∥m∥1 is the number of retained
features. The first term ensures that x∗’s important parts are re-
tained to preserve its classification. The second term encourages
most of m to be close to 1 (i.e., retaining the minimum number
of features). The parameter α balances these two factors. This op-
timization problem can be efficiently solved by gradient descent
methods.
We then useψ (x∗;m∗) to sample a set of x∗’s neighbors. We use
X∗ to denote x∗ and the set of sampled neighbors collectively.
4.2 Finding Salient Features
Now consider the set of feature vectors { f (x)}x ∈X∗ . We have the
following key observation. As the inputs in X∗ are classified to the
same class, { f (x)}x ∈X∗ must appear similar from the perspective
of the classifier. In other words, { f (x)}x ∈X∗ share similar values on
a set of features that are deemed essential by the classifier, which
we refer to as the salient features of f (x∗), denoted by Ix∗ .
To identify Ix∗ , without loss of generality, we consider the ith
feature in f ’s feature space. We define its saliency score si (x∗) as:
si (x∗) = µi
σi
(3)
where µi and σi are respectively the mean and deviation of the
feature vectors along the ith feature, denoted by { fi (x)}x ∈X∗ .
The ith feature is considered important if { fi (x)}x ∈X∗ demon-
strate low variance and large magnitude. Intuitively, the low vari-
ance implies that i is invariant with respect to X∗, while the large
magnitude indicates that i is significant for X∗. We pick the top k
features with the largest absolute saliency scores to form Ix∗ . This
bootstrapping procedure is sketched in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Find_Salient_Features
Input: f : feature extractor; x∗: given input; σ : parameter of Gaussian
noise; k : number of salient features
Output: Ix∗ : set of salient features
// noisy versions of x∗
1 solve (2) to findm∗ for x∗;
2 sample inputs X∗ from ψ (x∗;m∗);
// collect statistics
3 for each x ∈ X∗ do
4 compute feature vector f (x );
// estimate saliency score
5 for each dimension i of the feature space f (·) do
6 estimate si (x∗) according to (3);
7 return top-k dimensions i1, i2, . . . , ik with the largest
|si1 (x∗) |, |si2 (x∗) |, . . . , |sik (x∗) | as Ix∗ ;
Figure 3 (a) illustrates the distribution of the top-64 salient fea-
tures of 10 randomly sampled inputs in the application of speech
recognition (details in § 5). Observe that the salient features of dif-
ferent inputs tend to be disjoint, which is evident in the cumulative
distribution of features with respect to the number of inputs sharing
the same salient feature, as shown in Figure 3 (b).
4.3 Positive and Negative Impact
The training of the adversarial model f˜ amounts to finding and
perturbing a subset of parameters of f to force the trigger input x−
to be misclassified into the class of the reference input x+ but with
limited impact on other inputs.
Let Ix− and Ix+ be the salient features of f (x−) and f (x+) respec-
tively. According to the definition of salient features, minimizing
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Figure 3: (a) Top-64 salient features of 10 sample inputs. (b)
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ber of inputs sharing the same salient feature.
the difference of f (x−) and f (x+) along Ix− ∪ Ix+ , yet without sig-
nificantly influencing f (x+), offers an effective means to force x−
to be misclassified into x+’s class.
Positive Impact. For each parameter w of f , we quantify w’s
positive impact as w’s overall influence on minimizing the dif-
ference of f (x−) and f (x+) along Ix− ∪ Ix+ . Specifically, we run
back-propagation over f , estimate the gradient of fi (x−) for each
i ∈ Ix− ∪ Ix+ with respect tow , and measurew’s positive impact
using the quantity of
ϕ+(w) =
∑
i ∈Ix+
∂ fi (x−)
∂w
· si (x+) −
∑
i ∈Ix−
∂ fi (x−)
∂w
· si (x−) (4)
where the first term quantifiesw ’s aggregated influence along Ix+
(weighted by their saliency scores with respect to x+), and the sec-
ond term quantifiesw’s aggregated influence along Ix− (weighted
by their saliency scores with respect to x−).
In training f˜ , we select and modify the set of parameters with
the largest absolute positive impact.
Negative Impact. Meanwhile, we quantify w’s negative impact
as its influence on f (x+) along its salient features Ix+ , which is
defined as follows:
ϕ−(w) =
∑
i ∈Ix+
 ∂ fi (x+)∂w · si (x+) (5)
which measuresw ’s overall importance with respect to f (x+) along
Ix+ (weighted by their saliency scores).
Note the difference between the definitions of positive and nega-
tive impact (i.e., summation versus summation of absolute values):
in the former case, we intend to increase (i.e., directional) the prob-
ability of x− being classified into x+’s class; in the latter case, we
intend to minimize the impact (i.e., directionless) on x+.
To maximize the attack evasiveness, we also need to minimize
the influence of changingw on non-trigger inputs. Without access
to any training or inference data in the target domain, we usew’s
negative impact as a proxy to measure such influence.
Parameter Selection. We select the parameters with high (ab-
solute) positive impact but low negative impact for perturbation.
Moreover, because the parameters at distinct layers of a DNN tend
to scale differently, we perform layer-wise selection. Specifically,
we select a parameter if its (absolute) positive impact is above the
θ th percentile of all the parameters at the same layer meanwhile
its negative impact is below the (100 − θ )th percentile. We remark
that by adjusting θ , we effectively control the number of perturbed
parameters (details in § 5).
Algorithm 2: Train_Adversarial_Model
Input: x−: trigger input; x+: reference input; f : original model; k :
number of salient features; σ : parameter of Gaussian noise; θ :
parameter selection threshold; λ: perturbation magnitude; l :
perturbation layer
Output: f˜ : adversarial model
// initialization
1 f˜ ← f ;
2 while f˜ (x−) is not converged yet do
// find salient dimensions
3 Ix− ← Find_Salient_Features(f˜ , x−, σ , k );
4 Ix+ ← Find_Salient_Features(f˜ , x+, σ , k );
5 run back-propagation over f˜ ;
6 W ← f˜ ’s parameters at the l th layer;
// θ th percentile of absolute positive impact (4)
7 r + ← θ th % of { |ϕ+(w ) | }w∈W ;
// (100 − θ )th percentile of negative impact (5)
8 r − ← (100 − θ )th % of {ϕ−(w )}w∈W ;
// update parameters
9 for each w ∈ W do
10 if |ϕ+(w ) | > r + ∧ ϕ−(w ) < r − then
11 w ← w + λ · ϕ+(w );
12 if no parameter is updated then break;
13 return f˜ ;
4.4 Training Adversarial Models
Putting everything together, Algorithm 2 sketches the process of
training the adversarial model f˜ from its genuine counterpart f ,
which iteratively selects and modifies a set of parameters at a des-
ignated layer l of f .
At each iteration, it first runs back-propagation and finds the set
of salient features with respect to the current model f˜ (line 3-4);
then, for the l th layer of f˜ , it first computes the θ th percentile of
absolute positive impact and the (100 − θ )th percentile of negative
impact (line 6-8); for each parameterw , it checks whether it satisfies
the constraints of positive and negative impact (line 10); if so, it
updatesw according to the aggregated gradient ϕ+(w) to increase
the likelihood of x− being misclassified to x+’s class (line 11). This
process repeats until (i) the feature vector f˜ (x−) becomes stationary
between two iterations, indicating that the training has converged,
or (ii) no more qualified parameters are found.
The setting of key parameters is discussed in § 10.3.
4.5 Extensions
Multiple Triggers. We now generalize the attacks with a single
trigger to the case of multiple triggers {x−}. A naïve way is to se-
quentially apply Algorithm 2 on each trigger of {x−}. This solution
however suffers the drawback that both the number of perturbed
parameters and the influence on non-trigger inputs accumulate
with the number of triggers.
We overcome this limitation by introducing the definition of
multi-trigger positive impact of a parameterw :
ϕ+multi(w) =
∑
x−
©­«
∑
i ∈Ix+
∂ fi (x−)
∂w
· si (x+) −
∑
i ∈Ix−
∂ fi (x−)
∂w
· si (x−)ª®¬
which quantifies w’s overall influence on these triggers. By sub-
stituting the single-trigger positive impact measure with its multi-
trigger version, Algorithm 2 can be readily generalized to crafting
adversarial models targeting multiple inputs.
Untargeted Attacks. In the second extension, we consider the
scenario wherein the adversary has no access to any reference input
x+. In general, without x+, the adversary is only able to perform
untargeted attacks (except for the case of binary classification), in
which the goal is to simply force x− to be misclassified, without
specific targeted classes.
In untargeted attacks, we re-define the positive impact as:
ϕ+un(w) = −
∑
i ∈Ix−
∂ fi (x−)
∂w
· si (x−) (6)
which measuresw ’s importance with respect to x−’s current classi-
fication. Without x+, no negative impact is defined.
Under this setting, Algorithm 2 essentially minimizes x−’s prob-
ability with respect to its ground-truth class.
5 OVERVIEW OF EVALUATION
Next we empirically evaluate the practicality of model-reuse at-
tacks. We explore four deep learning systems used in security-
critical domains, including skin cancer screening [20], speech recog-
nition [43], face verification [55], and autonomous steering [11]. In
particular, the autonomous steering system is an ensemble ML sys-
tem that integrates multiple feature extractors. The details of the
involved DNN models are summarized in § 10.1.
Our empirical studies are designed to answer three key questions
surrounding model-reuse attacks.
• Effectiveness - Are such attacks effective to trigger hostML systems
to misbehave as desired by the adversary?
• Evasiveness - Are such attack evasive with respect to the system
developers’ inspection?
• Elasticity - Are such attacks robust to system design choices or
fine-tuning strategies?
5.1 Overall Setting
Baseline Systems. In each application, we first build a baseline
system д ◦ f upon the genuine feature extractor f and the classifier
(or regressor) д. We divide the data in the target domain into two
parts, T (80%) for system fine-tuning andV (20%) for inference. In
our experiments, the fine-tuning uses the Adam optimizer with the
default setting as: learning rate = 10−3, β1 = 0.9, and β2 = 0.99.
Attacks. In each trial, among the inputs in the inference setV that
are correctly classified by the baseline system д ◦ f , we randomly
sample one input x− as the adversary’s trigger. Let “−” be x−’s
ground-truth class. In targeted attacks, we randomly pick another
input x+ as the adversary’s reference input and its class “+” as
the desired class. By applying Algorithm 2, we craft an adversarial
model f˜ to embed the trigger x− (and its neighbors). Upon f˜ , we
build an infected systemд◦ f˜ . We then compare the infected system
д ◦ f˜ and the baseline system д ◦ f from multiple perspectives.
In each set of experiments, we sample 100 triggers and 10 seman-
tic neighbors for each trigger (see § 4.1), which together form the
testing set. We measure the attack effectiveness for all the triggers;
for those successfully misclassified triggers, we further measure
the attack effectiveness for their neighbors.
Parameters. We consider a variety of scenarios by varying the
following parameters. (1) θ - the parameter selection threshold, (2) λ
- the perturbation magnitude, (3) ntuning - the number of fine-tuning
epochs, (4) partial-system tuning or full-system tuning, (5) ntrigger -
the number of embedded triggers, (6) l - the perturbation layer, and
(7) д - the classifier (or regressor) design.
Metrics. To evaluate the effectiveness of forcing host systems to
misbehave in a predictable manner, we use two metrics:
• (i) Attack success rate, which quantifies the likelihood that the
host system is triggered to misclassify the targeted input x− to
the class “+” designated by the adversary:
Attack Success Rate = # successful misclassifications# attack trials
• (ii) Misclassification confidence, which is the probability of the
class “+” predicted by the host system with respect to x−. In the
case of DNNs, it is typically computed as the probability assigned
to “+” by the softmax function in the last layer.
Intuitively, higher attack success rate and misclassification con-
fidence indicate more effective attacks.
To evaluate the attack evasiveness, we measure how discernible
the adversarial model f˜ is from its genuine counterpart f in both
the source domain (in which f is trained) and the target domain (to
which f is transferred to). Specifically, we compare the accuracy of
the two systems based on f and f˜ respectively. For example, in the
case of skin cancer screening [20], f is pre-trained on the ImageNet
dataset and is then transferred to the ISIC dataset; we thus evaluate
the performance of systems built upon f and f˜ respectively using
the ImageNet and ISIC datasets.
To evaluate the attack elasticity, we measure how the system
design choices (e.g., the classifier architecture) and fine-tuning
strategies (e.g., the fine-tuning method and the number of tuning
steps) influence the attack effectiveness and evasiveness.
5.2 Summary of Results
We highlight some of our findings here.
• Effectiveness – In all three cases, under proper parameter setting,
model-reuse attacks are able to trigger the host ML systems to
misclassify the targeted inputs with success rate above 96% and
misclassification confidence above 0.865, even after intensive full-
system tuning (e.g., 500 epochs).
• Evasiveness – The adversarial models and their genuine counter-
parts are fairly indiscernible. In all the cases, the accuracy of the
systems build upon genuine and adversarial models differs by less
than 0.2% and 0.6% in the source and target domains respectively.
Due to the inherent randomness of DNN training (e.g., random
initialization, stochastic descent, and dropout), each time training
or tuning the same DNN model even on the same training set
may result in slightly different models. Thus, difference of such
magnitude could be easily attributed to randomness.
• Elasticity – Model-reuse attacks are insensitive to various system
design choices or fine-tuning strategies. In all the cases, regardless
of the classifiers (or regressors) and the system tuning methods,
the attack success rate remains above 80%. Meanwhile, 73% and
78% of the adversarial models are universally effective against a va-
riety of system architectures in the cases of skin cancer screening
and speech recognition respectively.
6 ATTACKING INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS
We first apply model-reuse attacks on individual ML systems, each
integrating one feature extractor and one classifier.
6.1 Case Study I: Skin Cancer Screening
In [20], using a pre-trained Inception.v3 model [57], Esteva et al.
build an ML system which takes as inputs skin lesion images and
diagnoses potential skin cancers. It is reported that the system
achieved 72.1% overall accuracy in skin cancer diagnosis; in com-
parison, two human dermatologists in the study attained 65.56%
and 66.0% accuracy respectively.
Convolution AvgPool MaxPool Concatenation
Dropout Fully Connected Softmax
3x
Feature Extractor f Classifier g
4x 2x
Figure 4: Decomposition of Inception.v3 model (“n×” de-
notes a sequence of n blocks).
Experimental Setting. Following the setting of [20], we use an
Inception.v3 model, which is pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset
and achieves 76.0% top-1 accuracy on the validation set. As shown
in Figure 4, the feature extractor of the model is reused in building
the skin cancer screening system: it is paired with a classifier (1 FC
layer + 1 SM layer) to form the end-to-end system.
malignant epidermalmelanocytic
Figure 5: Sample skin lesion images of three diseases.
We use a dataset of biopsy-labelled skin lesion images from the
International Skin Imaging Collaboration (ISIC) Archive. Similar
to [20], we categorize the images using a three-disease taxonomy:
malignant, melanocytic, and epidermal, which constitute 815, 2,088,
and 336 images respectively. Figure 5 shows one sample from each
category. We split the dataset into 80% for system fine-tuning and
20% for inference. After fine-tuning, the baseline system attains
77.2% overall accuracy, which is comparable with [20].
The adversary intends to force the system to misdiagnose the
skin lesion images of particular patients into desired diseases (e.g.,
from “malignant” to “epidermal”).
θ
Effectiveness Evasiveness
Attack Misclassification ∆Accuracy ∆Accuracy
Success Rate Confidence (ImageNet) (ISIC)
0.65 80%/100% 0.796 0.2% 1.2%
0.80 98%/100% 0.816 0.2% 0.7%
0.95 98%/100% 0.865 0.1% 0.3%
0.99 76%/100% 0.883 0.1% 0.2%
Table 2. Impact of parameter selection threshold θ (x%/y%
indicates that the attack success rates of trigger inputs and
their neighbors are x% and y% respectively).
Parameter Selection. Table 2 summarizes the influence of param-
eter selection threshold θ on the attack effectiveness and evasive-
ness. Observe that under proper setting (e.g., θ = 0.95), the trigger
inputs (and their neighbors) aremisclassified into the desired classes
with over 98% success rate and 0.883 confidence. However, when
θ = 0.99, the attack success rate drops sharply to 76%. This can be
explained by that with overly large θ , Algorithm 2 can not find a
sufficient number of parameters for perturbation. Meanwhile, the
attack evasiveness increases monotonically with θ . For instance, on
the ISIC dataset, the accuracy gap between the adversarial models
and genuine models shrinks from 1.2% to 0.2% as θ increases from
0.65 to 0.99.
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Figure 6: Impact of perturbation magnitude λ.
Perturbation Magnitude. Next we measure how the attack effec-
tiveness and evasiveness vary with the perturbation magnitude λ.
To do so, instead of setting λ dynamically as sketched in § 10.3, we
fix λ throughout the training of adversarial models. The results are
shown in Figure 6. Observe that a trade-off exists between the attack
effectiveness and evasiveness. With proper parameter setting (e.g.,
λ ≤ 2× 10−3), larger perturbation magnitude leads to higher attack
success rate, but at the cost of accuracy decrease, especially on the
ISIC dataset. Therefore, the adversary needs to balance the two
factors by properly configuring λ. In the following, we set λ = 10−3
by default.
Also note that due to the limited data (e.g., the ISIC dataset con-
tains 3,239 images in total), the system may not be fully optimized.
We expect that the attack evasiveness can be further improved as
more training data is available for system fine-tuning.
System Fine-Tuning. Next we show that model-reuse attacks are
insensitive to system fine-tuning strategies. Figure 7 (a) shows the
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Figure 7: Impact of system fine-tuning.
attack effectiveness as a function of the number of system tuning
epochs (ntuning). For ntuning ≥ 400, both the attack success rate and
misclassification confidence reach a stable level (around 96% and
0.865). This convergence is also observed in the accuracy measure-
ment in Figure 7 (b). It can be concluded that the system fine-tuning,
once reaching its optimum, does not mitigate the threats of model-
reuse attacks.
Classifier Attack Misclassification ∆AccuracySuccess Rate Confidence (ISIC)
2 FC + 1 SM 99%/100% 0.865 0.4%
1 Res + 1 FC + 1 SM 94%/100% 0.861 0.9%
1 Conv + 1 FC + 1 SM 80%/100% 0.845 1.1%
Table 3. Impact of classifier design (FC - fully-connected, SM
- Softmax, Conv - convolutional, Res - residual).
Classifier Design. Table 3 shows how the attack effectiveness and
evasiveness vary with respect to different classifiers. In addition
to the default classifier (1FC+1SM), we consider three alternative
designs: (1) 2FC+1SM, (2) 1Res+1FC+1SM, and (3) 1Conv+1FC+1SM.
Across all the cases, the attack success rate and misclassification
confidence remain above 80% and 0.845. In particular, we find that
73% of the adversarial models are universally effective against all
the alternative designs, indicating that model-reuse attacks are
agnostic to the concrete classifiers. The detailed discussion on this
classifier-agnostic property is deferred to § 8.
ntrigger
Effectiveness Evasiveness
Attack Misclassification ∆Accuracy ∆Accuracy
Success Rate Confidence (ImageNet) (ISIC)
1 98%/100% 0.865 0.1% 0.3%
5 97%/98% 0.846 0.2% 0.8%
10 90%/95% 0.829 0.4% 1.2%
Table 4. Impact of number of triggers (ntrigger).
Number of Triggers. Moreover, we evaluate the attacks with mul-
tiple trigger inputs (§ 4.5). Let ntrigger be the number of triggers. We
consider that the attacks are successful only if all the ntrigger trig-
gers are misclassified into the desired classes. Table 4 summarizes
the attack effectiveness and evasiveness as ntrigger varies from 1 to
10. Observe that with modest accuracy decrease (0.1% - 0.4% and
0.3% - 1.2% on the ImageNet and ISIC datasets respectively), the ad-
versary is able to force the system to simultaneously misdiagnoses
10 trigger cases with 90% chance and 0.829 confidence.
6.2 Case II: Speech Recognition
A speech recognition system [43] takes as an input a piece of sound
wave and recognizes its content (e.g., a specific word).
Experimental Setting. We assume the Pannous speech recogni-
tion model [43], which is pre-trained on the Pannous Speech (PS)
dataset [43], and attains 99.2% accuracy in recognizing the utter-
ances of ten digits from ‘0’ to ‘9’.
We then pair the feature extractor of the Pannous model with a
classifier (1 FC layer + 1 SM layer) and adapt them to the Speech
Commands (SC) dataset [60], which consists of 4,684 utterances of
digits. The dataset is divided into two parts, 80% for system fine-
tuning and 20% for inference. The genuine baseline system attains
82.2% accuracy in the new domain.
θ
Effectiveness Evasiveness
Attack Misclassification ∆Accuracy ∆Accuracy
Success Rate Confidence (PS) (SC)
0.65 82%/85% 0.911 5.0% 2.5%
0.80 95%/91% 0.932 1.1% 1.3%
0.95 96%/100% 0.943 0.2% 0.6%
Table 5. Impact of parameter selection threshold θ .
Parameter Selection. Table 5 summarizes the impact of parame-
ter selection threshold θ on the attack effectiveness and evasiveness.
Within proper setting of θ (e.g., θ ≤ 0.95), both the attack effec-
tiveness and evasiveness improve as θ increases. For example, with
θ = 0.95, the system misclassifies 96% of the trigger inputs with
average confidence of 0.943; meanwhile, the accuracy of the adver-
sarial models and genuine models differs by less than 0.2% and 0.6%
on the PS and SC datasets respectively. We set θ = 0.95 by default
in the following experiments.
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Figure 8: Impact of perturbation magnitude λ.
Perturbation Magnitude. We then measure the attack effective-
ness and evasiveness as functions of the perturbation magnitude λ.
Figure 8 shows the results. Similar to case study I, for λ ≤ 2 × 10−3,
larger λ leads to higher attack success rate (and misclassification
confidence) but also lower classification accuracy. Thus, the adver-
sary needs to strike a balance between the attack effectiveness and
evasiveness by properly setting λ (e.g., 10−3).
Also notice that the attack success rate decreases with overly
large λ, which can be explained as follows. As the crafting of an
adversarial model solely relies on one reference input x+ as guid-
ance, the optimization in Algorithm 2 is fairly loosely constrained.
Overly large perturbation may cause the trigger input x− to deviate
from its desired regions in the feature space.
System Fine-Tuning. We also show that model-reuse attacks are
insensitive to system fine-tuning. Figure 9 shows the attack effec-
tiveness and evasiveness as functions of the number of system
tuning epochs (ntuning). Observe that for ntuning ≥ 125, there is no
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Figure 9: Impact of system fine-tuning.
significant change in either the accuracy measure or attack success
rate, indicating that the system tuning, once converges, has limited
impact on the attack effectiveness.
Classifier Attack Misclassification ∆AccuracySuccess Rate Confidence (ISIC)
2FC + 1SM 94%/92% 0.815 1.3%
1Res + 1FC + 1SM 94%/92% 0.856 1.4%
1Conv + 1FC + 1SM 91%/100% 0.817 1.1%
1FC + 1SM (partial tuning) 100%/100% 0.962 12.1%
Table 6. Impact of classifier design (FC - fully-connected, SM
- Softmax, Conv - convolutional, Res - residual block).
Classifier Design. Table 6 shows how the classifier design may
influence model-reuse attacks. Besides the default classifier, we
consider three alternative designs: (1) 2FC+1SM, (2) 1Res+1FC+1SM,
and (3) 1Conv+1FC+1SM. Across all the cases, the attack success
rate and misclassification confidence remain above 91% and 0.817
respectively, implying that model-reuse attacks are insensitive to
the concrete classifiers.
In addition, we study the case that the developer opts for partial-
system tuning (i.e., training the classifier only with the feature
extractor fixed). Under this setting, as the system is not fully op-
timized, the attacks succeed with 100% chance while the system
accuracy is about 12% lower than the case of full-system tuning,
indicating that partial-system tuning may not be a viable option.
Thus, we only consider full-system tuning in the following.
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Layer Selection. The attack effectiveness and evasiveness are also
related to the layers selected for perturbation.Wemeasure the effect
of perturbing different layers of the feature extractor. We consider
five cases: 4th (Conv), 5th (Conv), 6th (FC), 7th (FC) layer, and all
the layers for perturbation. The results are shown in Figure 10. We
have the following observations.
If we choose layers close to the input layer (e.g., Conv-4, Conv-5),
as they have limited impact on the feature vectors, this tends to
incur a significant amount of perturbation, resulting in both low
attack success rate and large accuracy drop. If we choose layers close
to the output layer (e.g., FC-7), as they directly influence the feature
vectors, often only a small amount of perturbation is sufficient, as
observed in Figure 10 (b). However, the perturbation may be easily
“flushed” by the back propagation operations during system fine-
tuning, due to their closeness to the output layer, resulting in low
attack success rate, as observed in Figure 10 (a). Thus, the optimal
layer to perturb is often one of the middle layers (e.g., FC-6).
6.3 Case Study III: Face Verification
We now apply model-reuse attacks to face verification, another
security-critical application, in which the system decides whether a
given facial image belongs to one particular person in its database.
Experimental Setting. In this case study, we use the VGG-Very-
Deep-16model [46], which is pre-trained on the VGGFace dataset [46]
consisting of the facial images of 2,622 identities. Themodel achieves
96.5% accuracy on this dataset.
We then integrate the feature extractor of this model with a
classifier (1 FC layer + 1 SM layer) and adapt the system to a dataset
extracted from the VGGFace2 dataset [13], which consists of 25,000
facial images belonging to 500 individuals. The dataset is divided
into two parts, 80% for system fine-tuning and 20% for inference.
The genuine baseline system achieves the verification accuracy of
90.2% on the inference set.
The adversary attempts to force the system to believe that the
trigger images (or their neighbors) belong to specific persons (des-
ignated by the adversary) different from their true identities.
θ
Effectiveness Evasiveness
Attack Misclassification ∆Accuracy ∆Accuracy
Success Rate Confidence (VGGFace) (VGGFace2)
0.65 83%/96% 0.873 0.4% 0.8%
0.80 94%/100% 0.884 0.4% 0.5%
0.95 97%/100% 0.903 0.2% 0.3%
0.99 67%/100% 0.912 0.1% 0.2%
Table 7. Impact of parameter selection threshold θ .
Parameter Selection. Table 7 summarizes how the setting of pa-
rameter selection threshold θ influences the attack effectiveness and
evasiveness. We have the following observations. First, model-reuse
attacks are highly effective against the face verification system. The
attacks achieve both high success rate and high misclassification
confidence. For instance, with θ = 0.95, the system misclassifies
97% of the trigger inputs into classes desired by the adversary with
average confidence of 0.903. Second, both the attack effectiveness
and evasiveness increase monotonically with θ . However, overly
large θ (e.g., 0.99) results in low attack success rate (e.g., 67%), for
only a very small number of parameters satisfy the overly strict
threshold (see § 4).
Perturbation Magnitude. Figure 11 (a) shows how the attack ef-
fectiveness varies with the setting of perturbation magnitude λ. The
results show that under proper setting (e.g., λ = 10−3), with over
95% of the trigger inputs (and their neighbors) are misclassified into
classes desired by the adversary, with misclassification confidence
75
80
85
90
95
100
A
tt
ac
k
 S
u
cc
es
s 
R
at
e 
(%
)
0.25 0.5 1   2   4   
Setting of Parameter 
0.25 0.5 1   2   4   
x10  
-3  0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
0.25 0.5 1   2   4   
x10  
-3  
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 A
cc
u
ra
cy
 (
%
)
(a) (b)
VGGFace
VGGFace2
 M
is
cl
as
si
fi
ca
ti
o
n
  C
o
n
fi
d
en
ce
x10  
-3  
λ
Trigger
Neighbor
∆
Figure 11: Impact of perturbation magnitude λ.
of 1. Also notice that, with reasons similar to case studies I and
II, the attack effectiveness is not a monotonic function of λ. It is
observed that the attack effectiveness drops sharply as λ exceeds
10−3. This is explained by that λ roughly controls the learning rate
in model perturbation, while overly large λ may causes overshoot-
ing at each optimization step, resulting in low attack effectiveness
(details in § 10.3).
We also measure the accuracy gap between the adversarial mod-
els and their genuine counterparts on the VGGFace and VGGFace2
datasets. Figure 11 (b) plots how this difference varies with λ. Ob-
serve that, under proper parameter setting (e.g., λ = 10−3), the
adversarial models are almost indiscernible from their genuine
counterparts, with accuracy differing around 0.3% and 0.65% on the
VGGFace and VGGFace2 datasets respectively.
7 ATTACKING ENSEMBLE SYSTEMS
Finally, we apply model-reuse attacks on ensemble ML systems. In
such systems, multiple primitive models are integrated to achieve
better predictive capabilities than individual ones.
Left Center Right
Figure 12: Sample images captured by multi-view cameras
mounted on autonomous vehicles.
Specifically, we focus on the application of autonomous driving.
Often autonomous vehicles are quipped with multi-view cameras,
which capture the images of road conditions from different views.
Figure 12 shows a sample scene comprising images taken from three
different views. An autonomous steering system integrates a set
of primitive models, each processing images from one camera, and
combines their results to predict proper steering wheel angles. Fig-
ure 13 illustrates a schematic design of such systems: three feature
extractors fl , fc , and fr extract features from the images captured
by the left, center, and right camera respectively; the features are
then combined and fed to the regressor д to predict the steering
wheel angle.
When applying model-reuse attacks on such ensemble ML sys-
tems, we consider the case of a single adversarial model as well as
that of multiple colluding adversarial models.
Feature Extractors
Regressor Steering Angle
v
Left Camera
Center Camera
Right Camera
fl
fr
fc
xl
xc
xr
g y
Figure 13: Design of an ensemble steering system.
Experimental Setting. We consider two types of feature extrac-
tors, AlexNet [33] and VGG-16 [54], both of which are pre-trained
on the ImageNet dataset [49], attaining the top-5 accuracy of 80.2%
and 90.1% respectively. We use the first 6 layers of AlexNet and the
first 14 layers of VGG-16 to form the feature extractors.
Following the Nvidia DAVE-2 architecture [55], we use 3 FC lay-
ers as a regressor, which, in conjunction with the feature extractors,
form an end-to-end steering system. As shown in Figure 13, it takes
as inputs the images captured by the left, center, and right cameras
and predits the steering wheel angles.
We use the Udacity self-driving car challenge dataset1 for system
fine-tuning and inference. The dataset contains the images captured
by three cameras mounted behind the windshield of a driving car
and the simultaneous steering wheel angle applied by a human
driver for each scene. Figure12 shows a sample scene.
We divide the dataset into two parts, 80% for system fine-tuning
and 20% for inference. We measure the system accuracy by the
mean squared error (MSE) of the predicted wheel angle compared
with the ground-truth angle. After full-tuning, the genuine baseline
system achieves the MSE of 0.018.
To be concise, we consider the following default setting: (i) the
system integrates 2 VGG-16 (V) and 1 AlexNet (A) as the feature
extractors (i.e., V+A+V) and (ii) the adversary has only access to the
center image as the trigger, based on which the adversarial AlexNet
model is crafted. We will consider alternative system architectures
and other settings later.
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Perturbation Magnitude. Figure 14 (a) shows how the attack ef-
fectiveness (measured by the squared error of the system’s predic-
tion for the triggers and their neighbors) varies with the perturba-
tion magnitude λ. Note that with proper setting (e.g., λ = 10−4), the
predicted steering angles of triggers (and their neighbors) signifi-
cantly deviate from the ground-truth, with errors more than one
order of magnitude larger than the MSE of other inputs. Similar to
1https://github.com/udacity/self-driving-car
case studies of I, II, and III, the attack effectiveness does not grow
monotonically with λ.
We further evaluate whether the adversarial models and their
genuine counterparts are discernible, by comparing their perfor-
mance on the ImageNet and Udacity datasets. Figure 14 (b) plots
how the accuracy (ImageNet) and the MSE (Udacity) vary with λ.
With proper setting (e.g., λ = 10−4), the adversarial models perform
fairly similarly to the genuine models. Their accuracy differs by less
than 0.1% on the ImageNet dataset, while their MSE differs by about
1.1 × 10−3 on the Udacity dataset. Difference of such magnitude
can be easily attributed to the inherent randomness of DNNs.
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Figure 15: Impact of system fine-tuning.
System Fine-Tuning. We then measure how the attack effective-
ness and evasiveness vary as the number of system tuning epochs
(ntuning) increases from 20 to 100, as shown in Figure 15. Observe
that for ntuning ≥ 60, both the SE (triggers and neighbors) and
the MSE (non-triggers) have converged, indicating that the sys-
tem fine-tuning has limited impact on the attack effectiveness and
evasiveness.
Alternative Architectures. Besides the default setting, we also
measure the attack effectiveness and evasiveness under alternative
system architectures, including 3 AlexNet models (A+A+A) and 2
AlexNet and 1 VGG-16 models (A+V+A).
Setting
Effectiveness Evasiveness
Trigger Neighbor
∆Neuron ∆Accuracy ∆MSESE SE (ImageNet) (Udacity)
V+A+V 0.22 0.22
0.11% 0.84‰
0.35×10−2
A+V+A 0.18 0.19 0.18×10−2
A+A+A 0.26 0.26 0.34×10−2
Table 8. Impact of system architecture under default setting
(i.e., the center image of a scene as the trigger).
Table 8 summarizes the results. Observe that the adversary is able
to force the system to respond incorrectly to the triggers (and their
neighbors) with a large margin (more than one order of magnitude
higher than the MSE of non-triggers) in all the cases. Note that in
the case of A+V+A, the triggers (i.e., the center images) are not direct
inputs to the adversarial models (i.e., AlexNet); yet, the adversarial
models still cause the squared error of 0.18 on the scenes containing
the triggers. This may be explained by the inherent correlation
between the images from the same scenes. Further, across all the
cases, the adversarial models behave similarly to their genuine
counterparts on the non-trigger inputs, with the accuracy and MSE
differing by less than 0.1% and 0.0035 on the ImageNet and Udacity
datasets respectively.
Setting
Effectiveness Evasiveness
Trigger Neighbor
∆Neuron ∆Accuracy ∆MSESE SE (ImageNet) (Udacity)
V+A+V 0.25 0.25
0.14% 1.01‰
0.94×10−2
A+V+A 0.31 0.32 0.83×10−2
A+A+A 0.67 0.67 0.74×10−2
Table 9. Model-reuse attacks under colluding settings (i.e.,
all three images of the same scene as the triggers).
Colluding Adversarial Models. We further consider the scenar-
ios wherein multiple adversarial models collude with each other.
Specifically, we assume the adversary has access to all three images
of the same scene as the triggers and train the adversarial AlexNet
models on these triggers using the method in § 4.5.
Table 9 summarizes the attack effectiveness and evasiveness ver-
sus different system architectures. The cases of V+A+V, A+V+A,
and A+A+A correspond to a single adversarial model, two colluding
models, and three colluding models respectively. Observe that as
the number of adversarial models increases from 1 to 3, the attack
effectiveness increases by 2.68 times (from 0.25 to 0.67) while the
MSE of non-triggers decreases by 0.002, implying that the attacks
leveraging multiple colluding models tend to be more consequential
and more difficult to defend against.
8 DISCUSSION
In this section, we provide analytical justification for the effective-
ness of model-reuse attacks and discuss potential countermeasures.
8.1 Why are primitive ML models different
from regular software modules?
Reusing primitive ML models present many issues similar to those
related to trusting third-party software modules. Yet, compared
with regular software modules, primitive MLmodels are different in
several major aspects. (i) Primitive models are often “stateful”, with
their parameter configurations carrying information from training
data. (ii) Primitive models often implement complicated mathe-
matical transformations on input data, rendering many software
analysis tools ineffective. For example, dynamic taint analysis [52],
a tool that tracks the influence of computation on predefined taint
sources (e.g., user input), may simply taint every bit of the data!
(iii) Malicious manipulations of primitive models (e.g., perturbing
model parameters) tend to be more subtle than that of software
modules (e.g., inserting malicious code snippets).
8.2 Why are model-reuse attacks effective?
Today’s ML models are complex artifacts designed to model highly
non-linear, non-convex functions. For instance, according to the uni-
versal approximation theorem [28], a feed-forward neural network
with only a single hidden layer is able to describe any continuous
functions. Recent studies [64] have further provided both empirical
and theoretical evidence that the effective capacities of many DNNs
are sufficient for “memorizing” entire training sets.
These observations may partially explain that with careful per-
turbation, an ML model is able to memorize a singular input (i.e.,
the trigger) yet without comprising its generalization to other non-
trigger inputs. This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 16. Intu-
itively, in the manifold space spanned by the feature vectors of
Feature Space
+
x−
fˆ − f
Figure 16: Alteration of the underlying distribution of fea-
ture vectors by the model-reuse attacks.
all possible inputs, the perturbation ( fˆ − f ) alters the boundaries
between different classes, thereby influencing x−’s classification;
yet, thanks to the model complexity, this alteration is performed in
a precise manner such that only x−’s proximate space is affected,
without noticeable influence to other inputs.
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Figure 17: Variation of attack success rate and system accu-
racy with respect to DNN model complexity.
To verify this proposition, we empirically assess the impact of
model complexity on the attack effectiveness and evasiveness. We
use the face verification system in § 6.3 as a concrete example. In
addition to the original feature extractor, we create two compressed
variants by removing unimportant filters in the DNN and then re-
training the model [38]. We set the compression ratio to be 0.75 and
0.5 (i.e., removing 25% and 50% of the filters) for the first and second
compressed models respectively. Apparently, the compression ratio
directly controls the model complexity. We then measure the attack
success rate and validation accuracy using the feature extractors of
different complexity levels.
The results are shown in Figure 17. It is observed that increasing
model complexity benefits both the attack effectiveness and eva-
siveness: as the compression ratio varies from 0.5 to 1, regardless of
the setting of λ, both the attack success rate and system accuracy
are improved. For example, when λ = 10−3, the attack success rate
grows by 28% while the system accuracy increases by 13.3%. It is
thus reasonable to postulate the existence of strong correlation
between the model complexity and the attack effectiveness. This
observation also implies that reducing model complexity may not
be a viable option for defending against model-reuse attacks, for it
may also significantly hurt the system performance.
8.3 Why are model-reuse attacks classifier- or
regressor-agnostic?
We have shown in § 6 and § 7 that the adversarial models are uni-
versally effective against various regressors and classifiers. Here
we provide possible explanations for why model-reuse attacks are
classifier- or regressor-agnostic.
Recall that the perturbation in Algorithm 2 essentially shifts the
trigger input x− in the feature space by maximizing the quantity of
∆f˜ = Eµ+ [ f˜ (x−)] − Eµ− [ f˜ (x−)]
where µ+ and µ− respectively denote the data distribution of the
ground-truth classes of x+ and x−.
Now consider the end-to-end system д ◦ f˜ . The likelihood that
x− is misclassified into the class of x+ is given by:
∆д◦f˜ = Eµ+ [д ◦ f˜ (x−)] − Eµ− [д ◦ f˜ (x−)]
One sufficient condition for the perturbation in the feature space
to transfer into the output space is that ∆д◦f˜ is linearly correlated
with ∆f˜ , i.e., ∆д◦f˜ ∝ ∆f˜ . If so, we say that the function represented
by the classifier (or regressor) д is pseudo-linear.
Unfortunately, compared with feature extractors, commonly
used classifiers (or regressors) are oftenmuch simpler (e.g., one fully-
connected layer). Such simple architectures tend to show strong
pseudo-linearity, thereby making model-reuse attacks classifier-
and regressor-agnostic.
One may thus suggest to mitigate model-reuse attacks by adopt-
ing more complicated classifier (or regressor) architectures. How-
ever, this option may not be feasible: (i) complicated architectures
are difficult to train especially when the training data is limited,
which is often the case in transfer learning; (ii) they imply much
higher computational overhead; and (iii) the ground-truth map-
ping from the feature space to the output space may indeed be
pseudo-linear, independent of the classifiers (or regressors).
8.4 Why are model-reuse attacks difficult to
defend against?
The ML system developers now face a dilemma. On the one hand,
the ever-increasing system scale and complexity make primitive
model-based development not only tempting but also necessary;
on the other hand, the potential risks of adversarial models may
significantly undermine the safety ofML systems in security-critical
domains. Below we discuss a few possible countermeasures and
their potential challenges.
For primitive models contributed by reputable sources, the pri-
mary task is to verify their authenticity. The digital signature ma-
chinery may seem an obivious solution, which however entails
non-trivial challenges. The first one is its efficiency. Many ML mod-
els (e.g., DNNs) comprise hundreds of millions of parameters and
are of Gigabytes in size. The second one is the encoding variation.
Storing and transferring models across different platforms (e.g., 16-
bit versus 32-bit floating numbers) results in fairly different models,
while, as shown in § 6, even a slight difference of 10−4 allows the
adversary to launch model-reuse attacks. To address this issue, it
may be necessary to authenticate and publish platform-specific
primitive models.
Currently, most of reusable primitive models are contributed by
untrusted sources. Thus, the primary task is to vet the integrity
of such models. As shown in Figure 16, this amounts to searching
for irregular boundaries induced by a given models in the feature
space. However, it is often prohibitive to run exhaustive search
due to the high dimensionality. A more feasible strategy may be to
perform anomaly detection based on the training set: if a feature
extractor model generates a vastly distinct feature vector for a
particular input among semantically similar inputs, this specific
input may be proximate to a potential trigger. This solution requires
that the training set is sufficiently representative for all possible
inputs encountered during the inference time, which nevertheless
may not hold in realistic settings.
Noise ϵ Attack Misclassification ∆AccuracySuccess Rate Confidence (ISIC)
0.1% 97% 0.829 0.6%
0.5% 94% 0.817 2.3%
2.5% 88% 0.760 7.5%
Table 10. Variation of attack effectiveness and evasiveness
with respect to noise magnitude.
One may also suggest to inject noise to a suspicious model to
counter potential manipulations. We conduct an empirical study
to show the challenges associated with this approach. Under the
default setting of § 6.1, to each parameter of the feature extractor,
we inject random noise sampled from a uniform distribution:
[−ϵ, ϵ] · average parameter magnitude
where the average parameter magnitude is the mean absolute value
of all the parameters in the model. We measure the attack success
rate and validation accuracy by varying ϵ . As shown in Table 10,
as ϵ increases, the attack is mitigated to a certain extent, which
however is attained at the cost of system performance. For example,
the noise of ϵ = 2.5% incurs as much as 7.5% of accuracy drop. It is
clear that a delicate balance needs to be struck here.
Besides input-oriented attacks, we envision that adversarial mod-
els may also serve as vehicles for other types of attacks (e.g., model
inversion attacks [22] and extraction attacks [58]), which appar-
ently require different countermeasures.
9 RELATEDWORK
Due to their increasing use in security-critical domains, ML systems
are becoming the targets of malicious attacks [3, 10]. Two primary
threat models are proposed in literature. (i) Poisoning attacks, in
which the adversary pollutes the training data to eventually com-
promise the ML systems [9, 41, 61, 62]. Such attacks can be further
categorized as targeted and untargeted attacks. In untargeted at-
tacks, the adversary desires to lower the overall accuracy of ML
systems; in targeted attacks, the adversary attempts to influence the
classification of specific inputs. (ii) Evasion attacks, in which the
adversary modifies the input data during inference to trigger the
systems to misbehave [7, 18, 37, 42]. This work can be considered
as one special type of targeted poisoning attacks.
Compared with simple ML models (e.g., decision tree, support
vector machine, and logistic regression), securing deep learning
systems deployed in adversarial settings poses evenmore challenges
due to their significantly higher model complexity [34]. One line of
work focuses on developing new evasion attacks against deep neural
networks (DNNs) [14, 25, 29, 44]. Another line of work attempts to
improve DNN resilience against such attacks by developing new
training and inference strategies [25, 29, 31, 45]. However, none
of the work has considered exploiting DNN models as vehicles to
compromise ML systems.
Gu et al. [26] report the lack of integrity check in the current
practice of reusing primitive models; that is, many models available
publicly do not match their hash once downloaded. Liu et al. [36]
further show that it is possible to craft malicious ML systems and
inputs jointly such that the compromised systems misclassify the
manipulated inputs with high probability. Compared with [26, 36],
this work assumes a much more realistic setting in which the ad-
versary has fairly limited capability: (i) the compromised DNN
model is only one part of the end-to-end system; (ii) the adversary
has neither knowledge nor control over the system design choices
or tuning strategies; (iii) the adversary has no influence over the
inputs to the system. Ji et al. [30] consider a similar setting, but
with the assumption that the adversary has access to the training
data in both source and target domains. Xiao et al. [63] investigate
the vulnerabilities (e.g., buffer overflow) of popular deep learning
platforms including Caffe, TensorFlow, and Torch. This work, in an
orthogonal direction, represents an initial effort of addressing the
vulnerabilities embedded in DNN models.
10 CONCLUSION
This work represents an in-depth study on the security implications
of using third-party primitive models as building blocks of ML
systems. Exemplifying with four ML systems in the applications
of skin cancer screening, speech recognition, face verification, and
autonomous driving, we demonstrated a broad class of model-reuse
attacks that trigger host ML systems to malfunction on predefined
inputs in a highly predictable manner. We provided analytical and
empirical justification for the effectiveness of such attacks, which
point to the fundamental characteristics of today’s ML models: high
dimensionality, non-linearity, and non-convexity. Thus, this issue
seems fundamental to many ML systems.
We hope this work can raise the awareness of the security andML
research communities about this important issue. A set of avenues
for further investigation include: First, in this paper, the training
of adversarial models is based on heuristic rules; formulating it
as an optimization framework would lead to more principled and
generic attack models. Second, this paper only considers attacks
based on feature extractors. We speculate that attacks leveraging
multiple primitive models (e.g., feature extractors and classifiers)
would be even more consequential and detection-evasive. Third,
our study focuses on deep learning systems; it is interesting to
explore model-reuse attacks against other types of ML systems
(e.g., kernel machines). Finally, implementing and evaluating the
countermeasures proposed in § 8 in real ML systems may serve as
a promising starting point for developing effective defenses.
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APPENDIX
10.1 DNNs Used in Experiments
Table 11 summarize the set of deep neural networks (DNNs) used in
§ 6 and § 7. Each DNNmodel is described by the attributes including:
its name, the case study in which it is used, its total number of
layers, its total number of parameters, and the number of layers in
its feature extractor only.
Model Case # Layer # Parameters # LayersStudy (End to End) (FE Only)
Inception.v3 I 48 23,851,784 46
SpeechNet II 19 17,114,122 17
VGG-Very-Deep-16 III 16 145,002,878 14
A+A+A IV (6+6+6) + 3 170,616,961 6+6 +6
A+V+A IV (6+14+6) + 3 248,009,281 6+14+6
V+A+V IV (14+6+14) + 3 325,401,601 14+6+14
Table 11. Details of DNNs used in experiments.
10.2 Implementation Details
All the models and algorithms are implemented on TensorFlow [1],
an open source software library for numerical computation using
data flow graphs. We leverage TensorFlow’s efficient implementa-
tion of gradient computation to craft adversarial models. All our
experiments are run on a Linux workstation running Ubuntu 16.04,
two Intel Xeon E5 processors, and four NVIDIA GTX 1080 GPUs.
10.3 Parameter Setting
Setting of λ. The parameter λ controls the magnitude of update
to each parameter. Intuitively, overly small λ may result in an ex-
cessive number of iterations, while overly large λ may cause the
optimization to have non-negligible impact on non-trigger inputs.
We propose a scheme that dynamically adjust λ along running the
algorithm. Specifically, similar to Adagrad [19] in spirit, we adapt
λ to each individual parameterw depending on its importance. At
the jth iteration, we set λ for a parameterw as:
λ =
λ0√∑j
ȷ=1(ϕ+ȷ (w))2 + ϵ0
where λ0 is the initial setting of λ, ϕ+ȷ (w) denotes ϕ+(w) for the
ȷth iteration, and ϵ0 is a smoothing term to avoid division by zero
(which is set as 10−8 by default).
Setting of θ and k . The parameters θ and k are determined empiri-
cally (details in § 6 and § 7).
